Quanta and Patent Exhaustion: The Implications of the Supreme Court\u27s Decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. One Year Later by Van Vliet, Emily
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 
Volume 11 Issue 1 Article 18 
2010 
Quanta and Patent Exhaustion: The Implications of the Supreme 
Court's Decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. 
One Year Later 
Emily Van Vliet 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst 
Recommended Citation 
Emily Van Vliet, Quanta and Patent Exhaustion: The Implications of the Supreme Court's Decision in 
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. One Year Later, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 453 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol11/iss1/18 
The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the 
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing. 
VAN VLIET E. Quanta and Patent Exhaustion: The Implications of the Supreme 
Court’s Decision in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. One Year Later. 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.2010;11(1):453-475.  
453 
Note 
Quanta and Patent Exhaustion: The Implications 
of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Quanta 
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc. One Year 
Later 
Emily Van Vliet* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Patent exhaustion is an historic doctrine stemming from 
Supreme Court decisions. In essence, patent exhaustion states 
that the authorized sale of an article that substantially 
embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder’s rights. In other 
words, once a patent holder sells a patented article, he may not 
collect royalties from second, third or later owners of the same 
patented article. This doctrine protects purchasers or licensees 
of patented items by preventing patent holders from collecting 
duplicitous royalties. While patent exhaustion has been 
developed judicially, the last time the Supreme Court 
addressed it in depth was in 1942. Since then, the landscape of 
technology has been revolutionized in ways unimagined in 
1942, and lower courts have applied the doctrine to the field of 
computers, electronics, and other areas of advanced technology 
with varying results. 
On June 9, 2008, the United States Supreme Court handed 
down a new decision on patent exhaustion, part of a series of 
significant decisions relating to patents.1 While many of the 
                                                          
 2010 Emily Van Vliet. 
* Emily Van Vliet is a registered Patent Agent and a 3L at the University of 
Minnesota Law School. 
 1. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2117 
(2008) (clarifying that patent exhaustion applies to method claims); see also 
Bilski v. Doll, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009) (granting certiorari); KSR Int’l Co. v. 
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419–20 (2007) (lowering the bar for a finding of 
unpatentability due to nonobviousness); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genetech, Inc., 
549 U.S. 118, 128–132, 137 (2007) (expanding the standing of licensees in 
challenging patent validity); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 
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practical implications of Quanta v. LG Electronics are yet to be 
seen, the decision is written narrowly enough that, if applied by 
lower courts with careful attention to patentable distinction 
and the intent of the parties in a contract, it will have minimal 
effects on the status quo in patent law. Additionally, the 
TransCore court’s application of Quanta’s clarification of patent 
exhaustion to covenants not to sue provides helpful guidance 
that will allow patent professionals to anticipate the effect that 
patent exhaustion will have on their work.2 
This Comment provides a legal overview of the historical 
doctrine of patent exhaustion and discusses permissible 
limitations on patent rights. Next, it follows the progression of 
the Quanta v. LGE decision as it made its way from the 
Northern District of California to the Supreme Court. Finally, 
it considers the implications that the Supreme Court’s decision 
has had and will continue to have for lower courts and patent 
professionals, and how these institutions and individuals ought 
to apply the ruling. 
II.  A LOW RESOLUTION SKETCH OF QUANTA AND 
RELATED PATENT DOCTRINES 
A.  PATENT EXHAUSTION: NO AUTOMATED REFRESH 
Patent exhaustion, also referred to as the “first sale 
doctrine,” is a judicial doctrine established by the Supreme 
Court.3 Patent exhaustion essentially states that the 
authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a 
patent exhausts the patent holder’s rights. In Bloomer v. 
Millinger, the Supreme Court first described patent holders’ 
rights and their relationship to patent exhaustion: 
Patentees acquire the exclusive right to make and use, and vend to 
others to be used, their patented inventions for the period of time 
specified in the patent, but when they have made and vended to 
others to be used one or more of the things patented, to that extent 
                                                          
452–54 (2007) (limiting patent holders’ ability to recover damages for 
international infringement). 
 2. TransCore, LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 1271, 
1274–77 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 3. See, e.g., Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456–57 (1873) (holding that 
when a patentee receives royalties for the full use of his patented article, that 
article has passed beyond his control); Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 
340, 350 (1863) (noting that patent owners are entitled to only one royalty for 
a patented machine). 
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they have parted with their exclusive right. They are entitled to but 
one royalty for a patented machine, and consequently when a 
patentee has himself constructed the machine and sold it, or 
authorized another to construct and sell it, or to construct and use 
and operate it, and the consideration has been paid to him for the 
right, he has then to that extent parted with his monopoly, and 
ceased to have any interest whatever in the machine so sold or so 
authorized to be constructed and operated.4 
The foundational rule articulated in Bloomer v. Millinger 
has seen little change throughout the development of modern 
patent law, and has been applied in numerous other cases. For 
example, United States v. Univis Lens Co. is a foundational 20th 
century patent exhaustion case arising out of an antitrust 
dispute brought by the United States against Univis Lens.5 
Univis owned a number of patents on multifocal lenses used in 
eyeglasses.6 Univis licensed its patents to a related 
organization, in which Univis held a majority of the stock, to 
manufacture blank lenses and sell them to specified patentees.7 
Univis’s framework required licensee wholesalers, finishing 
retailers and prescription retailers to abide by a price 
maintenance program governing costs of finished and 
unfinished lenses.8 This price maintenance formed the 
foundation for the government’s antitrust complaint.9 In 
contrast to the government’s argument, the Court noted 
Univis’s interest in controlling the prices of the lenses because 
finishing the lenses into a usable product required the use of its 
patented inventions.10 
The Supreme Court found that Univis’s patents were 
exhausted because, in large part, each lens blank had no 
practical utility outside of being processed into an eyeglass 
lens.11 The Court went on to say: 
[W]here one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it 
embodies essential features of his patented invention, is within the 
protection of his patent, and has destined the article to be finished by 
the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold his invention so 
far as it is or may be embodied in that particular article. . . . In 
                                                          
 4. Bloomer, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 350. 
 5. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 242–43 (1942). 
 6. Id. at 243. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 244–45. 
 9. Id. at 248. 
 10. See id. at 248–49. 
 11. Id. at 249–50. 
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construing and applying the patent law so as to give effect to the 
public policy which limits the granted monopoly strictly to the terms 
of the statutory grant, the particular form or method by which the 
monopoly is sought to be extended is immaterial. The first vending of 
any article manufactured under a patent puts the article beyond the 
reach of the monopoly which that patent confers. 
 
Whether the licensee sells the patented article in its completed form or 
sells it before completion for the purpose of enabling the buyer to finish 
and sell it, he has equally parted with the article, and made it the 
vehicle for transferring to the buyer ownership of the invention with 
respect to that article.12 
The phrase “embodies essential features” and the reference 
to giving effect to “public policy” governing patent law are of 
particular note. The idea of essentially embodying the 
invention is an important element of patent exhaustion today, 
as discussed later, but the point at which an item “essentially 
embodies” a patented invention is often difficult to discern.13 
Public policy forms a foundation for the doctrine of patent 
exhaustion, and thus is always a significant consideration in 
patent litigation.14 Finally, Univis makes it clear that the 
authorized purchase of an unfinished article carries with it the 
right to complete the article in those cases where the article 
has no practical purpose outside of that covered by the patent.15 
Over time, courts have extended the principle of patent 
exhaustion beyond a single unfinished authorized article to 
apply to higher level assembly products where one component 
is an authorized article.16 Cyrix Corp. v. Intel Corp.17 
exemplifies this shift in a patent infringement context. In 
Cyrix, Intel had obtained a patent, the first claim of which 
                                                          
 12. Id. at 250–52 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 13. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S.Ct. 2109, 2118–20 
(2008) (comparing the lenses in Univis which embodied the essential features 
of the patent to the microprocessors in the present case, which also embodied 
the essential features of the patent). 
 14. See Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in 
the Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 31–32 (2001) (comparing the 
foundations of patent exhaustion with implied license and concluding that 
they are based on different policies, and can therefore result in different 
outcomes). 
 15. Univis, 316 U.S. at 250. 
 16. William P. Skladony, Commentary on Select Patent Exhaustion 
Principles in Light of the LG Electronics Cases, 47 IDEA 235, 238 (2007). 
 17. 846 F. Supp. 522 (E.D. Tex. 1994), aff’d, 42 F.3d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
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covered a microprocessor device.18 Claims 2 and 6 covered the 
combination of claim 1 with different types of external 
memory.19 Intel brought suit against Cyrix, the customer of one 
of its licensees, alleging that it infringed claims 2 and 6 for 
combining the microprocessor device covered by claim 1 with 
external memory.20 While Intel’s license to the vendor, who sold 
microprocessors to Cyrix, explicitly covered both these 
microprocessors and even microprocessors used in combination 
with Intel products, it did not cover the microprocessors used in 
combination with non-Intel products.21 The district court’s 
decision recognized parallels between Intel’s microprocessors 
and the products at issue in Univis.22 The court noted that 
Cyrix had no practical option for the use of the authorized 
microprocessors other than to combine them with external 
memory, thereby infringing claims 2 and 6.23 The court found 
that “[t]he sale . . . of a claim 1 microprocessor exhausts Intel’s 
patent rights . . . including without limitation in claims 1, 2 and 
6. . . . Intel is barred by the doctrine of patent exhaustion from 
asserting claims 2 and 6 . . . against Cyrix . . . .”24 
Neither Cyrix nor Univis addresses an important concept 
often discussed in the context of patent exhaustion: patentable 
distinctiveness. According to the principle of patentable 
distinctiveness, if in a combination claim or patent, both the 
authorized component and combination are patentably 
separate and distinct, that claim or patent is not exhausted by 
the authorized sale or use of the component alone.25 This 
concept was further described by the court in In re Horneman: 
It is settled law that a party might be entitled to a patent for a 
combination because of the cooperation of the elements contained 
therein, and at the same time be entitled to a separate patent for one 
of the elements of the combination. In such a case, the question to be 
determined is whether two or more different inventive concepts are 
involved. If the claims are so related that the separately claimed 
                                                          
 18. Id. at 541. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 528, 531. 
 21. Id. at 534–35. 
 22. Id. at 540. 
 23. Id. at 541. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See John W. Osborne, A Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A 
Standard Based on Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 643, 674 (2004). 
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element constitutes the essential distinguishing feature of the 
combination as claimed, different concepts are not involved, the 
inventions are not distinct, and double patenting will be found. 
Conversely, where the element does not constitute the sole 
distinguishing novelty in the combination the inventions are distinct 
and double patenting will not be found.26 
The Horneman court also highlighted the implications of 
claiming combinations where the combination itself does not 
involve a unique inventive concept. While this practice will 
generally be compensated for during the patent prosecution 
process when the claims appear in separate patents, it is likely 
that claims to a unique inventive concept and claims to the 
combination of that inventive concept with elements that are 
well known will appear in the same patent.27 
B.  PATENTS AND CONTRACTS: AS INTERCONNECTED AS 
MICROPROCESSORS AND MEMORY 
As demonstrated by Cyrix and Univis, contractual 
agreements play significant roles in patent practice and theory. 
The concept of an “authorized” article in patent exhaustion is 
dependent upon the contractual relationships between the 
parties involved. It is well established that patents, like other 
types of property, can be governed by contracts.28 A patentee 
may “withhold rights granted under the patent laws, but may 
not impose any limitations on the sale of an article which are 
outside the bounds of the rights granted under the patent 
laws.”29 Such a restriction or limitation within the bounds of 
rights granted by the patent laws is lawful and cannot be 
negated by the patent exhaustion doctrine.30 Such restrictions 
                                                          
 26. In re Horneman, 92 U.S.P.Q. 316, 319 (C.C.P.A. 1952). 
 27. If a single party files two patent applications on the same date, where 
one claims a unique inventive concept and the other claims that same concept 
in combination with well known elements, the examiner will likely issue an 
obviousness-type double patenting rejection and require the party to file a 
terminal disclaimer. The terminal disclaimer will disclaim any patent term for 
one patent that may extend beyond the life of the first patent to expire and 
promise not to sell or license the patents separately from each other. If a 
single patent contains claims directed both to the inventive concept alone and 
the inventive concept in combination with known elements, both claims will 
likely be allowed if the examiner finds that the claim directed to the inventive 
concept alone meets statutory requirements for patentability. 
 28. See, e.g., Osborne, supra note 25, at 660. 
 29. Osborne, supra note 25, at 658. 
 30. See id. But this raises a question of what restrictions and limitations 
are within the bounds of rights granted by the patent laws. 
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must be clear and explicit: “purchasers of patented goods who 
lack knowledge of any restrictions should be free to use the 
goods in an unlimited manner . . . .”31 
For example, the district court in Western Electric Co. v. 
General Talking Pictures Co. found that sale by license did not 
deprive the patent owners of the right to exclude the defendant 
from particular fields of operation and distribution.32 General 
Talking Pictures was later affirmed by the Supreme Court, 
which made clear that the doctrine of patent exhaustion only 
applies to implied, not explicit, restrictions on purchased 
goods.33 This limitation parallels the concept of covenants on 
real property, which are traditionally enforceable only if the 
purchaser had constructive notice of the restriction.34 In 
Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 
the district court upheld license restrictions on genetically 
modified seeds where the conditions were explicitly noted on 
the label of the product.35 In Hewlett-Packard v. Repeat-O-Type, 
the Federal Circuit emphasized the necessity that a restriction 
or condition must be explicit: “A noncontractual intention is 
simply the seller’s hope or wish, rather than an enforceable 
restriction.”36 In that case, Hewlett-Packard had included the 
instructions “discard old print cartridge immediately” in its 
instruction manual for a printer and contended that this 
created an enforceable condition preventing reuse of the 
cartridges.37 The Federal Circuit held that this did not create a 
conditional sale; the cartridges were instead sold 
unconditionally.38 
                                                          
 31. Id. 
 32. W. Elec. Co. v. Gen. Talking Pictures Corp., 16 F. Supp. 293, 298 
(S.D.N.Y. 1936), aff’d, 91 F.2d 922 (C.C.P.A. 1937), aff’d sub nom. Gen. 
Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938), aff’d on reh’g, 305 
U.S. 124 (1938). 
 33. See Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 (1938). 
But see Shubha Ghosh, Carte Blanche, Quanta, and Competition Policy, 34 J. 
CORP. L. 1209, 1226 (2009) (arguing that the doctrine of patent exhaustion is 
mandatory, and thus a contract term that purports to limit the application of 
patent exhaustion may be preempted). 
 34. Osborne, supra note 25, at 660 n.53. 
 35. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. v. Ottawa Plant Food, Inc., 283 F. Supp. 2d 
1018, 1048–49 (N.D. Iowa 2003). 
 36. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 F.3d 
1445, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 37. Id. at 1447, 1453. 
 38. Id. at 1455. 
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While sales of patented articles can be lawfully restricted, 
patent exhaustion cannot be disclaimed.39 In United States v. 
Masonite Corp., the Court found that a patentee could not 
assert that exhaustion of a combination claim was disclaimed 
where the patentee had recovered a full royalty for the 
combination through the sale of a component of the 
combination:40 
[W]hen the patented product ‘passes to the hands of the purchaser, it 
is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes outside of it, 
and is no longer under the protection of the act of Congress.’ . . . In 
applying that rule this Court has quite consistently refused to allow 
the form into which the parties chose to cast the transaction to 
govern. The test has been whether or not there has been such a 
disposition of the article that it may fairly be said that the patentee 
has received his reward for the use of the article.41 
Intent of the parties involved in a patent agreement is 
critical to construing the extent of the rights involved, because 
a patent agreement is treated as a traditional contract.42 The 
Supreme Court made this clear in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. 
Medipart, Inc.: 
Unless the condition violates some other law or policy . . . private 
parties retain the freedom to contract concerning conditions of 
sale . . . . The appropriate criterion is whether Mallinckrodt’s 
restriction is reasonably within the patent grant, or whether the 
patentee has ventured beyond the patent grant and into behavior 
having an anticompetitive effect not justifiable under the rule of 
reason. Thus a lawful express restriction cannot be negated by the 
doctrine of patent exhaustion. This is true because an unconditional 
sale, required for patent exhaustion, cannot exist where there is a 
lawful express restriction.43 
The principle of respecting parties’ intent is long 
established and is viewed as an important tenant of contract 
law. One author went so far as to say, “it is beyond question 
that [a]n agreement respecting patent rights is a contract and 
must therefore be construed so as to give effect to the intent of 
the parties.”44 
                                                          
 39. Osborne, supra note 25, at 662. 
 40. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 277–78 (1942). 
 41. Id. (quoting Bloomer v. McQewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 549 (1852)) 
(citations omitted). 
 42. See Osborne, supra note 25, at 660. 
 43. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992) 
(citations omitted). 
 44. John W. Osborne, Justice Breyer’s Bicycle and the Ignored Elephant of 
Patent Exhaustion: An Avoidable Collision in Quanta v. LGE, 7 J. MARSHALL 
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Intent is also an important consideration when analyzing a 
quasi-contract corollary to patent exhaustion: implied contract. 
While patent exhaustion is based in patent policies that 
somewhat limit the rights of a patent holder, implied contract 
stems from contract law. Because “implied license is a doctrine 
of quasi-contract, [it] depends on the beliefs and expectations of 
the parties to the sales transaction.”45 The doctrine of implied 
contract often results in the same end as patent exhaustion: 
“[B]uying a product carries with it an implied right to use and 
resell the product.”46 Because contract theory and patent law 
have different underlying policies, however, applying patent 
exhaustion or implied contract doctrine to a particular 
situation can easily lead to divergent results.47 
C.  QUANTA V. LGE: THE CROSSED WIRES OF PATENT 
EXHAUSTION AND CONTRACT LAW 
Quanta v. LGE48 is located at the frequently traversed 
intersection of patent law and contract law. Its journey from 
the Northern District of California to the Supreme Court is 
described below. 
1.  District Court 
Quanta began as two cases in the Northern District of 
California, decided in 2002 and 2003: LG Electronics, Inc. v. 
Advance Creative Computer Corp.49 and LG Electronics, Inc. v. 
Asustek Computer, Inc.,50 respectively. Both cases centered 
around a set of six computer related patents owned by LG 
Electronics (LGE),51 though only three were at issue in the 
                                                          
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 245, 259 (2008). 
 45. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 14, at 31–32. 
 46. Id. at 31. 
 47. One author describes patent exhaustion as a mandatory rule of patent 
licensing and implied licenses as a default rule of patent licensing. If there are 
no restrictions, then a downstream user has the right to use the patented 
invention under the doctrine of implied license. But if there are restrictions 
that extend beyond the scope of the patent holder’s rights, then patent 
exhaustion applies as a mandatory rule, allowing a downstream user to 
practice the patented invention. See Ghosh, supra note 33, at 1229. 
 48. 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008). 
 49. 212 F. Supp. 2d 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 50. 248 F. Supp. 2d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
 51. Asustek Computer, 248 F. Supp. 2d at 914; Advance Creative, 212 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1173–74. 
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consolidated Supreme Court case: U.S. Patent Nos. 4,939,641 
(‘641); 5,379,379 (‘379); and 5,077,733 (‘733).52 The ‘641 patent 
disclosed a system for ensuring that the most current data in a 
computer system are retrieved from memory by monitoring 
requests and updating main memory from the cache when the 
data requested are more current in the cache than in the main 
memory.53 The ‘379 patent relates to coordinating read and 
write requests to the main memory.54 The ‘733 patent describes 
methods for managing data traffic on a bus connecting two 
computer components.55 
LGE had licensed a patent portfolio, including the three 
patents described above, to Intel Corporation (Intel) in an 
agreement that permitted Intel to manufacture and sell 
microprocessors and chipsets that use the LGE patents.56 The 
agreement explicitly authorized Intel to “make, use, sell 
(directly or indirectly), offer to sell, import or otherwise dispose 
of” its products practicing the LGE patents.57 However, the 
license did stipulate that no license 
is granted by either party hereto . . . to any third party for the 
combination by a third party of Licensed Products of either party with 
items, components, or the like acquired . . . from sources other than a 
party hereto, or for the use, import, offer for sale or sale of such 
combination.58 
Additionally, the license claimed not to limit or alter the 
effect of patent exhaustion that would otherwise apply.59 In a 
separate written agreement (Master Agreement), Intel agreed 
to give notice to any of its own customers that the license with 
LGE “does not extend, expressly or by implication, to any 
product that you make by combining an Intel product with any 
non-Intel product.”60 
The two original district court cases involved customers of 
Intel who had combined products licensed by the LGE patents 
with non-Intel products. In the case involving Advance 
Creative, LGE alleged that the defendant along with another 
                                                          
 52. See Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2113. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 2113–14. 
 56. Id. at 2114. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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computer parts manufacturer had infringed all six of its 
patents relating to microprocessors and chipsets.61 Both 
defendants eventually stopped participating in the case, and 
the court entered default judgments against them.62 While the 
court found that the defendants infringed the patents, and 
granted LGE’s motion for injunctive relief, it found that the 
evidence did not support an award of damages.63 
In Asustek, LGE sued ten computer manufacturers for 
patent infringement of article and method claims. All of the 
companies had purchased microprocessors or chipsets from 
Intel and had installed them into computers that they 
manufactured.64 The court granted summary judgment for the 
defendants on the article claims.65 It rested its holding on 
Univis Lens, in which the Supreme Court said: 
[W]here one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it 
embodies essential features of his patented invention, is within the 
protection of his patent, and has destined the article to be finished by 
the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold his invention so 
far as it is or may be embodied in that particular article.66 
The court found specifically that the defendants’ purchase 
of the patented products was unconditional in that it was not 
conditioned on their agreement not to combine the products 
with non-Intel parts.67 The court did note, however, that the 
notice provided to the defendants was sufficient to negate a 
claim of implied license to practice the LGE patent in 
combination with non-Intel components.68 Finally, the court 
granted summary judgment for LGE on its motion that neither 
patent exhaustion nor implied license provided the computer 
manufacturers with a defense to LGE’s claim that they 
infringed the LGE patents.69 
                                                          
 61. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Advance Creative Computer Corp., 212 F. Supp. 2d 
1171, 1173–74 (N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 62. Id. at 1174–75, 1179. 
 63. Id. at 1176–79. 
 64. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 912, 914 
(N.D. Cal. 2003). 
 65. Id. at 918. 
 66. Id. at 915 (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 
250–51 (1942)). 
 67. Id. at 916–17. 
 68. Id. at 917. 
 69. Id. at 918. 
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2.  Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
In LG Electronics, Inc. v. Bizcom Electronics, Inc.,70 the 
appeal from Asustek, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals 
pursued every possible option simultaneously: the case was 
“affirmed-in-part, reversed-in-part, vacated-in-part, and 
remanded.”71 The court began by reviewing the implied license 
findings, noting that to prevail, defendants must establish that 
the products have no non-infringing use, and that the 
circumstances of the sale “‘plainly indicate that the grant of a 
license should be inferred.’”72 The appellate court agreed with 
the district court and found that no license could be implied.73 
In discussing patent exhaustion, the appellate court 
confirmed that it is only triggered by an unconditional sale; 
however, this court said the sale was conditional because the 
“LGE-Intel license expressly disclaim[ed] granting a license 
allowing computer system manufacturers to combine Intel’s 
licensed parts with other non-Intel components.”74 The license 
additionally required notice for the licensees.75 The appellate 
court reversed the district court’s decision on this issue and 
found that the article claims were not exhausted.76 It agreed 
with the district court, however, that the method claims were 
not exhausted.77 The court vacated and remanded several 
ancillary issues regarding the individual patents.78 
3.  Supreme Court 
When the Supreme Court heard Quanta, the Court focused 
on the issue of patent exhaustion, but did not address the 
question of implied license.79 In discussing patent exhaustion, 
the Court relied heavily on Univis Lens.80 Most notably, the 
                                                          
 70. 453 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 71. Id. at 1381. 
 72. Id. at 1369 (quoting Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited, Inc., 
803 F.2d 684, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1370. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1371. 
 79. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2121–22 
(2008). 
 80. Id. at 2116. 
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Court clearly answered the question of whether method claims 
are susceptible to patent exhaustion: they are.81 The Court 
looked to the practical consequences of this decision, noting 
that if method claims could not be exhausted, they would 
become an end-run around patent exhaustion, which a patent 
drafter could use to shield almost any item from patent 
exhaustion.82 
Next, the Court discussed what was required to trigger 
patent exhaustion. First, it noted that an article must embody 
essential features of the patented invention.83 Second, the 
article must be capable of use only in practicing the patent.84 
Finally, the sale must be authorized.85 In finding that the sale 
of the LGE microprocessors met each of these criteria, the 
Court drew analogies between the case at hand and Univis 
Lens.86 
Particularly when analyzing the question of an authorized 
sale, the Court looked to the structure of the license agreement 
between LGE and Intel.87 It noted that while Intel was 
required to give customers notice that the combination of the 
parts with non-Intel parts was not covered by the license, 
nothing prevented Intel from selling those parts to the 
customers even if it intended to use them in combination with 
non-Intel components.88 Additionally, because the notice 
requirement appeared in the Master Agreement, but not in the 
License Agreement, the parties did not even suggest that a 
breach of the Master Agreement would result in a breach of the 
License Agreement.89 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Quanta was predictable 
on many levels. Nevertheless, it offers significant guidance for 
lower courts in applying the doctrine of patent exhaustion to a 
world of technology where combination claims are abundant. 
4.  Quanta Applied: TransCore v. Electronic Transaction 
                                                          
 81. Id. at 2117. 
 82. Id. at 2118. 
 83. Id. at 2119. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 2118–20. 
 87. Id. at 2121–22. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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Consultants Corp. 
One of the first notable applications of the patent 
exhaustion doctrine—as clarified by Quanta—occurred in 
TransCore, LP v. Electronic Transaction Consultants Corp.90 
TransCore is a manufacturer of automated toll collection 
systems and the assignee of several patents related to that 
technology.91 In 2000, TransCore sued a competitor, Mark IV, 
for infringement of several patents.92 The suit was settled; 
Mark IV paid TransCore $4.5 million in exchange for an 
unconditional covenant not to sue.93 The covenant not to sue 
listed the patents covered and expressly stated that it “shall 
not apply to any other patents issued as of the effective date of 
this Agreement or to be issued in the future.”94 
Several years later, the defendant in the present case, 
ETC, won a bid to install and test open road tolling for the 
Illinois State Toll Highway Authority.95 ETC purchased and 
installed toll collection systems manufactured by Mark IV.96 
TransCore sued ETC for infringement of three patents that had 
been listed in the agreement with Mark IV along with a fourth, 
related patent (the ‘946 patent) that had been pending at the 
time of the agreement and had since issued.97 The district court 
ruled on summary judgment that TransCore’s patent rights 
were exhausted.98 TransCore appealed on the question of 
whether an unconditional covenant not to sue authorizes sales 
by the covenantee for purposes of patent exhaustion.99 
The Federal Circuit’s opinion relied heavily on Quanta’s 
statement of patent exhaustion that “‘the initial authorized 
sale of a patented item terminates all patent rights to that 
item.’”100 The court began with the premise that a patent does 
not provide a patentee with an affirmative right to practice an 
                                                          
 90. 563 F.3d 1271 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 91. Id. at 1273. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 1273–74 
 98. Id. at 1274. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. (quoting Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 
2115 (2008)). 
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invention, but rather the right to exclude.101 Since a patent 
holder cannot convey rights he does not own, any patent 
license, in a fundamental sense, is a waiver of the right to 
exclude (sue).102 In that way, the court reasoned, a non-
exclusive patent license is equivalent to a covenant not to sue 
and both can properly be viewed as allowing authorized sales 
by the licensee.103 Because the covenant generally stated that 
TransCore would not bring any claims for “future 
infringement” generally, TransCore failed to limit the covenant 
to actions such as “making,” “using,” or “selling.”104 The court 
found that all of the above actions were authorized for the 
purposes of patent exhaustion.105 
Further, the court found that the ‘946 patent, though 
expressly excluded by terms of the covenant, was also 
exhausted under an implied license to practice under the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel.106 This doctrine essentially 
estops a licensor from assigning a definable property right, and 
later trying to detract from that right by use of another patent 
necessary to the practice of the assigned or licensed patent.107 
Because the later issued ‘946 patent was necessary to practice 
at least one of the patents included in the covenant not to sue, 
the court found that Mark IV was an implied licensee of the 
‘946 patents.108 Mark IV’s rights extended to ETC.109 
III.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND PRACTICE 
IMPLICATIONS OF QUANTA 
Quanta, and TransCore’s application of Quanta, provide 
valuable guidance for practitioners drafting patent applications 
and licensing agreements in a post-Quanta world. 
A.  QUANTA, TRANSCORE, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: A BUNDLE OF 
WIRES 
While there is no doubt that the Supreme Court has 
                                                          
 101. Id. at 1275. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1275–76. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1279. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
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historically recognized the ability of patent owners to deal with 
patent rights like a bundle of wires that can be separated—a 
play on the Court’s venerable analogy of a bundle of sticks—the 
Court’s decision in Quanta and its application in TransCore 
may call that into question. The license in Quanta only covered 
Intel’s sale of the parts, but not the microprocessors used in the 
context of computers. This set of agreements was negotiated by 
two sophisticated parties who presumably sign similar 
contracts on a regular basis. But the Supreme Court did not 
recognize the intended limits of preventing third parties from 
combining patented microprocessors with non-Intel parts 
carved out by the Master Agreement. Instead of viewing the 
Supreme Court as refusing to recognize the limits of the Master 
Agreement, an alternate interpretation is available. That is, 
the Court merely interpreted the agreement differently from 
the Federal Circuit and found that the agreement was not 
conditional and did not limit the intellectual property licensed 
in the agreement. If the latter interpretation is true, it is 
possible that LGE and Intel were experiencing the 
consequences of sloppy contract drafting.110 Additionally, the 
holding in Quanta was quite fact specific, which supports the 
latter interpretation.111 If the reason for the finding of patent 
exhaustion in Quanta was the form and language involved in 
the agreements at issue, the Court left unanswered the 
question of whether it is possible to contract around patent 
exhaustion.112 
On the other hand, if lower courts interpret the holding in 
Quanta to mean that patent owners and licensees cannot 
contract around patent exhaustion, Quanta could have more 
                                                          
 110. See F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes, The Basics Matter: At the 
Periphery of Intellectual Property, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 174, 189 (2004). 
 111. See Richard P. Gilly & Mark S. Walker, Supreme Court’s Quanta 
Decision Clarifies the Reach of Patent Exhaustion, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., 
Sept. 2008, at 1, 1. 
 112. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2122 
n.7 (2008) (“We note that the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta does not 
necessarily limit LGE’s other contract rights. LGE’s complaint does not 
include a breach-of-contract claim, and we express no opinion on whether 
contract damages might be available even though exhaustion operates to 
eliminate patent damages.”). Regardless of whether parties can contract 
around patent exhaustion, they may be able to pursue breach of contract 
claims more successfully. 
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serious implications.113 Quanta could potentially be used to 
limit patent holders’ abilities to deal with their “bundle of 
sticks” as they see fit and may restrict their ability to divide 
their patent rights.114 UMG Recordings v. Augusto, a copyright 
infringement case focusing on the first sale doctrine that came 
out the day after Quanta, may be a first step in interpreting 
Quanta in this manner.115 TransCore also seems to support an 
interpretation that parties cannot contract around patent 
exhaustion. Although TransCore argued that it intended to 
limit the covenant not to sue to Mark IV, the court found 
evidence of intent irrelevant, and went one step further to find 
that Mark IV had an implied license for the ‘946 patent.116 
Additionally, the Quanta holding can be viewed as 
extremely limiting to patent holders’ rights when compared 
with the general property law policy disfavoring restraints on 
alienation.117 
In contrast, because different fields of technology tend to 
have different patenting styles and density, such a limitation 
could have positive effects on technologies such as computer 
hardware and software where a well-acknowledged “patent 
thicket” can make producing incremental technology 
complicated and expensive because of the high number of 
patents and licenses involved. This type of rationale could lead 
lower courts to limit application of Quanta specifically to 
computer hardware related fields.118 Such an application would 
                                                          
 113. Such a limitation on ability to contract would be interesting in light of 
MedImmune, where the Supreme Court did not explicitly deny patent holders 
the ability to contract to restrict their licensees’ ability to challenge the 
validity of a licensed patent. See Rachel Krevans & Daniel P. Muino, Restoring 
the Balance: The Supreme Court Joins the Patent Reform Movement, 9 SEDONA 
CONF. J. 15, 28 (2008). 
 114. See F. Scott Kieff, Quanta v. LG Electronics: Frustrating Patent Deals 
by Taking Contracting Options Off the Table?, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV., 315, 
325–26. 
 115. See UMG Recordings v. Augusto, 558 F.Supp.2d 1055, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 
2008). In UMG Recordings, a copyright owner sent promotional CD’s bearing 
labels noting that the CD’s were licensed to a music industry insider, but that 
the copyright owner retained the title. The court found that the label did not 
create a license and that music industry insider was authorized to resell the 
CD’s under the first sale doctrine. Id. at 1058, 1064. 
 116. See TransCore, LP v. Elec. Transaction Consultants Corp., 563 F.3d 
1271, 1279 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 117. See Kieff, supra note 114, at 325. 
 118. But see TransCore, 563 F.3d at 1273–74 (patents were not limited to 
the realm of computer hardware). 
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parallel the application of KSR’s obviousness holdings to the 
“predictable arts.”119 
Finally, another route lower courts could take would be to 
focus on alternative doctrines. For instance, the Supreme Court 
in Quanta never discussed the issue of implied license, though 
it was an issue raised earlier in the suit.120 The out-workings of 
such a suggestion would obviously depend upon the arguments 
raised by each plaintiff and defendant; however, if lower courts 
interpret Quanta as a result of poorly drafted contracts, 
perhaps third parties like Quanta could be protected in the 
future through doctrines such as implied license.121 
Additionally, lower courts ought to take into account the intent 
of parties involved in contracts. Intent is an important element 
of contract law, and courts’ consideration of intent would also 
comport well with the application of the doctrine of implied 
license.122 
B.  QUANTA IN PRACTICE 
Regardless of the route that district courts and the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit take in interpreting Quanta, 
practitioners can proactively learn valuable lessons from and 
avoid consequences similar to those resulting from the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of patents and contracts in 
Quanta. 
1.  Patent Prosecution 
Patent prosecutors have extremely difficult jobs. They are 
often called upon to foresee the future. They are expected to 
know what possible variations of an invention might want to be 
incorporated into claims in the future. They are expected to 
claim specific embodiments and portions of an invention that 
competitors are likely to make and sell. They must also know 
                                                          
 119. See Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 
1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 120. See generally Kieff, supra note 114, at 327–29 (discussing the doctrine 
of implied license). 
 121. Id. But see Ghosh, supra note 33, at 1226 (arguing that the doctrine of 
patent exhaustion is mandatory, and thus a contract term that purports to 
limit the application of patent exhaustion may be preempted). 
 122. See Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Repeat-O-Type Stencil Mfg. Corp., 123 
F.3d 1445, 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (discussing the relevance of “noncontractual 
intention”). 
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precisely what characterizes the inventive aspect of the product 
they are attempting to methodize. The Quanta Court reinforced 
this demand on patent prosecutors when it said of the Univis 
lens blanks, “exhaustion was triggered by the sale of the lens 
blanks because their only reasonable and intended use was to 
practice the patent and because they ‘embodie[d] essential 
features of [the] patented invention.’”123 
First, understanding the idea and implications of “essential 
features” is vital when drafting and prosecuting a patent 
application. Unfortunately for the patent community, the 
concept of an essential feature is full of ambiguity. As one 
author suggests, an essential feature is perhaps that which is 
used to distinguish an invention over prior art.124 However, the 
application of this principle to a variety of articles, methods, 
patents, and industries is unlikely to be straightforward.125 It is 
unclear where the line will be drawn between the addition of 
parts that clearly require creative decisions and standard 
components that are routinely used.126 To add to the ambiguity, 
courts in the early twentieth century used a similar concept for 
purposes of determining contributory infringement.127 The 
courts focused on which element of a patent claim was “key” or 
at the “heart of the invention.”128 Because this determination 
was so inherently subjective, courts used it as they wished, 
routinely ruling for patentees at the beginning of the period, 
and then ruling against patentees in the later part of the 
period.129 
Keeping in mind that the outcome of Quanta may have had 
more to do with licensing practice than patent exhaustion, and 
that the key concepts within Quanta are highly ambiguous, 
there are general precautionary principles practitioners can 
glean from the decision. 
A patent covering a single “essential feature” or a 
fundamental component with an “essential feature” which is 
                                                          
 123. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2119 (2008) 
(citing United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942)) (alterations 
in original). 
 124. See Osborne, supra note 25, at 673–674. 
 125. See Gilly & Walker, supra note 111, at 4. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See Kieff, supra note 114, at 321. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. 
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later incorporated into a larger product may be at greater risk 
of being exhausted. If the “essential feature” of the invention is 
embodied in a low-level component with a single practical use, 
later dependent claims covering the combination of that 
component with standard components in the art may become 
worthless. Under the assumption that an essential feature is 
one used to distinguish over prior art, practitioners should 
attempt to distinguish their case over the prior art on a variety 
of levels, creating multiple layers of “essential features.”130 
Practitioners can do this throughout the specification and 
claims of a patent application. The specification can highlight 
creative elements on both component and larger article 
levels.131 Dependent claims can be drafted to also incorporate 
levels of innovation, in contrast to using them to add standard 
parts to a single innovative element. While these ideas are 
undoubtedly difficult to implement, they are valuable 
considerations nonetheless. 
2.  Contracts and Licensing 
Attorneys and businesses can also proactively draft 
contracts using lessons learned from Quanta. While contracts 
drafted prior to Quanta and interpreted in light of Quanta may 
be shorted, practitioners can be proactive in drafting contracts 
in light of what they glean from Quanta and cases interpreting 
it. Smart contracting should center on the concept of an 
“authorized sale,” one of the essential requirements articulated 
by the Court for patent exhaustion.132 It is crucial to note that 
the Quanta Court found that the sale of the microprocessors at 
issue was not conditional.133 The Quanta court said, “Nothing 
in the License Agreement restricts Intel’s right to sell its 
microprocessors and chipsets to purchasers who intend to 
combine them with non-Intel parts.”134 At the same time, the 
                                                          
 130. See Osborne, supra note 25, at 673–674. 
 131. Additionally, practitioners can consider using a background section in 
the patent application to note potential non-infringing uses of elements of the 
patented article to avoid a finding, like that in both Univis and Quanta, that 
the article had no use outside of embodying the entire patented invention. 
 132. See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115 
(2008). 
 133. Id. at 2122 (“Intel’s authority to sell its products embodying the LGE 
Patents was not conditioned on the notice or on Quanta’s decision to abide by 
LGE’s directions in that notice.”). 
 134. Id. at 2121. 
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Master Agreement did require notice that third parties were 
not licensed to combine the microprocessors with non-Intel 
parts.135 This seems to indicate that a requirement of notice in 
a separate agreement without tangible conditions in the license 
agreement is insufficient to avoid patent exhaustion. 
In contrast, the Court does refer to the license in General 
Talking Pictures as different from that in Quanta.136 In General 
Talking Pictures, the license agreement was contained in a 
single document and had more direct and affirmative language 
than that in Quanta.137 Both parties knew that the 
manufacturer was not authorized to commercially sell the 
amplifiers in question.138 
It is unclear how cases like Mallinckrodt v. Medipart139 
will be viewed in light of the Court’s decision. In Mallinckrodt, 
the Federal Circuit upheld a single-use restriction in a label 
license as long as the terms were not objectionable under 
general contracts law and policy.140 In light of Quanta, a 
similar fact pattern today might produce a different outcome 
based on the rationale used by the Supreme Court.141 B. Braun 
Medical, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories explained Mallinckrodt 
further by saying that the exhaustion doctrine 
does not apply to an expressly conditional sale or license. In such a 
transaction, it is more reasonable to infer that the parties negotiated 
a price that reflects only the value of the “use” rights conferred by the 
patentee. As a result, express conditions accompanying the sale or 
license of a patented product are generally upheld.142 
Because the Court did not explicitly address situations 
                                                          
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. (citing Gen. Talking Pictures Corp. v. W. Elec. Co., 304 U.S. 175 
(1938)). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Gen. Talking Pictures, 304 U.S. at 180. 
 139. Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
 140. Kieff, supra note 114, at 323; see also Cohen & Lemley, supra note 14, 
at 33–34 (suggesting that Mallinckrodt may be an especially important case 
for software patent owners because they depend upon the ability to restrict 
usage of software through licensing that occurs in a variety of forms, including 
labels). 
 141. See, e.g., UMG Recordings v. Augusto, 558 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1064 
(C.D. Cal. 2008) (finding that a label on promotional CD’s retaining ownership 
for the copyright owners was preempted by the first sale doctrine.). This case 
specifically dealt with the first sale doctrine within copyright, however, not in 
the context of patents. 
 142. B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbot Labs. 124 F.3d 1419, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 
1997) (citations omitted). 
VANVLIET LF CHECK.WEB (DO NOT DELETE) 3/9/2010  11:48 AM 
474 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 11:1 
 
 
similar to Braun, it is probably still good law, and the use of 
express conditions should still be upheld. 
Based on the rationale of cases like General Talking 
Pictures, Mallinckrodt, and Braun, it appears that it would 
have been possible for LGE to contract around patent 
exhaustion by incorporating the agreement into a single 
agreement, instead of using a Master Agreement and a License 
Agreement. Additionally, language contained in the agreement 
could have explicitly made the sale of the microprocessors 
conditional upon Intel agreeing not to sell the parts to third 
parties who would later combine them with non-Intel parts. 
These variations on the LGE and Intel agreement can give 
parties tangible guidance for avoiding patent exhaustion. If 
patent owners desire to avoid patent exhaustion, the first step 
is to make any licensed use of their patented invention clearly 
conditional or limited. It is still unclear, however, what 
precisely will suffice to make a license clearly conditional. 
Practitioners looking to avoid patent exhaustion should follow 
the example of the parties in General Talking Pictures and 
should “condition or otherwise restrict the licensee’s rights 
(including reselling rights) with direct, affirmative language in 
the license from licensor to licensee.”143 Additionally, such 
language should be incorporated into a single agreement, to 
make it clear that the sale or use of the patented article is 
conditional upon limitations on the use of the patented article 
by the licensee. A licensor interested in seeking additional 
licenses on a particular patent may consider including 
language disclaiming the application of patent exhaustion to 
particular patents.144 
Finally, the Quanta court did note that they were not 
addressing the issue of contractual damages in their decision: 
We note that the authorized nature of the sale to Quanta does not 
necessarily limit LGE’s other contract rights. LGE’s complaint does 
not include a breach-of-contract claim, and we express no opinion on 
whether contract damages might be available even though exhaustion 
operates to eliminate patent damages. 145 
                                                          
 143. Gilly & Walker, supra note 111, at 4. 
 144. Several of the briefs filed in Quanta urged the Court to “hold that 
patent exhaustion is a non-waivable tenet grounded in public policy and thus 
not capable of being contracted away or otherwise disclaimed.” Id. at 5. The 
Court appeared not to reach this issue and therefore it is unclear whether 
expressly disclaiming patent exhaustion would be effective. Id. 
 145. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2122 n.7 
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While contract damages and related rights were not 
discussed in the Quanta decision, contractual damages could 
prove to be a creative alternative to recovering damages if 
patent damages become more difficult to enforce due to the 
increasing application of patent exhaustion. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
While in many ways the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Quanta v. LGE was unremarkable, though helpful in clarifying 
that patent exhaustion extends to method claims, the 
consequences of the decision have only begun to be seen. While 
the Court’s application of patent exhaustion in Quanta was 
clearly motivated, at least in part, by the ambiguous nature of 
the agreements at issue, the question of parties’ abilities to 
contract around patent exhaustion still remains. 
In applying Quanta, lower courts should be mindful of 
precedent by considering traditional property law and policies. 
Courts should also consider the intent of parties participating 
in the contract, particularly in the context of contracts drafted 
prior to the Quanta decision. Finally, lower courts should be 
aware of the body of technology to which they are applying the 
Quanta decision, recognizing the divergent natures of 
technology bases ranging from chemical compositions to 
computer software. 
Attorneys and businesses can apply lessons learned from 
Quanta in their practice. When drafting patent applications 
attorneys and agents should incorporate multiple levels of 
creative elements, distinguishing the present application over 
prior art when possible. They ought also to seek ways to 
incorporate additional creative combinations into dependent 
claims. When parties are drafting contracts and licensing 
agreements, they too can apply lessons learned from Quanta. 
Parties should to use clear, direct and affirmative language to 
create a conditional sale or use of the patented article or 
method. Additionally, any such conditions should be 
incorporated into the same document or agreement granting 
the license to the licensee. Finally, attorneys should remember 
the TransCore court’s application of patent exhaustion to a 
covenant not to sue, and always articulate whether a licensee is 
entitled to make, use, or sell a patented invention. 
                                                          
(2008). 
